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TULARE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT


MAY 01 2001


LARAYNE CLEEK, CLERK


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TULARE


People of the State of California, Plaintiff(s)


vs
Melvin Pyatt, Defendant(s)

TENTATIVE RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
CASE NO. 65724

FACTS


Defendant Melvin Pyatt was stopped by an officer of the California Highway Patrol on October 13, 2000, while driving a vehicle on Highway 99 in Tulare County. Defendant was eventually charged with four criminal violations, Penal Code Section 148, resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer in performance of his duties, a misdemeanor, and three Vehicle Code violations, 12500(A), driving without a license, a misdemeanor, 16028(A), driving without insurance, an infraction, and 4000(A), unregistered motor vehicle, an infraction. On December 8, 2000, defendant, who is representing himself, filed a demurrer to all counts to which the People have responded. On March 16, 2001, the District Attorney dismissed count one, the violation of Penal Code Section 148, leaving the defendant charged with the three Vehicle Code violations.

The defendant has submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury that alleges among other things that: (1) Based upon a religious belief, he does not have, nor has he ever had, a social security number; (2) He previously had a valid California drivers license and insurance on his vehicle; (3) Upon the enactment of Vehicle Code Section 1653.5 (which was effective January, 1, 1992) he has been unable to renew his California drivers license because that section made it a requirement that an applicant for a California drivers license supply the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) with their social security number; (4) Vehicle Code Section 1653.5 also requires that an applicant to register a vehicle supply DMV with a social security number; and, (5) Because he cannot obtain a valid California drivers license, he cannot obtain insurance for the vehicle.

Although the defendant has identified his motion as a demurrer, both the People in their response and the court in this ruling are treating it as a motion to dismiss.


ISSUE:


The issue raised by defendant is that Section 1653.5, by virtue of the requirement that an applicant for a California drivers license and/or vehicle registration supply the DMV with a social security number, violates his First Amendment right of freedom of religion. This issue has previously been litigated and Section 1653.5 has been held not to be a violation of one's right to freedom of religion, see discussion, infra. However, other apparent issues are raised by defendant's demurrer/motion to dismiss.



ANALYSIS:



Vehicle Code Section 1653.5 as effective January 1, 1992, provides among other things, that all forms used by the DMV for applications for the issuance or renewal of drivers licenses, ID cards and vehicle registrations must contain a section for the applicant's social security number.

Section 1653.5 has been challenged in court and three California Appellate Court cases have upheld the section's validity. Those cases in chronological order are Lauderbach v. Zolin (1995) 35 CA4th 578, 41 CR2d 434, Nowlin v. DMV (1997) 53 CA4th 1529, 62 CR2d 409, and Brunson v. DMV (1999) 72 CA4th 1251, 85 CR2d 710. All three cases involved the petitioners therein obtaining an order from the Superior Court enjoining the DMV from requiring a social security number before issuing a new or renewed drivers license, DMV identification cards, and vehicle registrations. In all three cases the respective appellate courts overruled the lower court and upheld the requirement within Section 1653.5 mandating an applicant supply a social security number.

Although the orders sought in all three cases were the same, i.e., enjoining the social security number requirement, the underlying issues differed in each case.

The court in Brunson overturned a Los Angeles Superior Court which had granted a writ of mandate prohibiting the DMV from denying petitioners a drivers license because they did not have a social security number. Petitioners had argued their right to freedom of religion was violated as it was against their religion to be identified by any sort of symbol or number. The appellate court determined that the social security number requirement was "religion neutral" and overruled the lower court.

In Nowlin the issues included whether the revealing of social security numbers was protected from disclosure under privacy laws and whether requiring the number was beyond the purpose for which the number is issued. The Nowlin Court overruled a Los Angeles Superior Court order enjoining the DMV from requiring a social security number saying that statutory provisions allowing the DMV to disclose social security numbers in certain situations was valid as it involved a legislative intent to assist in tracking and enforcing errant parents for child support.

The Lauderbach case evolved from foreign nationals obtaining an order from the San Francisco Superior Court enjoining the DMV from requiring a social security number for drivers licenses or ID cards. The Lauderbach court overturned the Superior Court order agreeing with the Nowlin decision, infra, that the privacy issue could not be grounds for enjoining the DMV and further held that the DMV is not required to issue drivers licenses or ID cards to those persons whose presence in the U.S. is not authorized by federal law.

While the three above cited cases and the instant case all involve the Section 1653.5 requirement of a social security number being necessary for anyone seeking to obtain a drivers license, ID card, or vehicle registration, the instant case differs in one notable manner. The defendant herein, rather than seeking an injunction, is charged with a criminal offense for which he could be subjected to imprisonment and/or a fine. It further appears that the reason he does not have a drivers license is because of the mandate within Section 1653.5.

In this day and age, especially in California, driving a motor vehicle is almost an indispensable part of life as driving enables one to perform the basics of life-traveling to and from employment, shopping for necessities, medical appointments, etc. The People in their opposition to the motion to dismiss properly point out that there is no constitutional right to drive a vehicle upon the streets and highways. There is however a privilege to drive subject to one's ability to do so safely. Thus the state has a public safety interest in licensing drivers to assure that they are mentally, physically, and emotionally able to operate a motor vehicle without endangering the lives and property of others.

The obvious intent of Vehicle Code Section 12500 (driving without a license) with which defendant Pyatt is charged is to require that anyone operating a vehicle upon the streets and highways of the state be "screened" before they drive to insure they can safely operate that vehicle and are knowledgeable with the traffic laws. Thus the licensing requirements of a written exam, driving test, eye examination, etc. It would most certainly appear that Section 1653.5 is not relevant to this "screening" process. In fact this position is conceded in Lauderbach wherein the court said, "It is undisputed that the Legislature's purpose in enacting section 1653.5 was to help affected agencies seek `more effective ways to locate the whereabouts of errant parents for purposes of carrying out child support programs and directives."' Thus, it is clear that Section 1653.5 is included within the DMV application procedure to facilitate a state interest separate and apart from the state interest of assuring that only persons capable of safely operating a vehicle be allowed the privilege of driving.

Section 1653.5 could just as well require an applicant submit proof of payment of taxes, proof of having voted, proof of employment, or any other thing in which the state has an interest; this list could be endless and would still be meaningless to the purpose of issuing a drivers license. The state does have an interest in licensing drivers but this interest is one which concerns public safety. In essence, the state's interest under the licensing laws is to protect motorists, and those motorists want to be assured that other motorists can drive their vehicles properly and could care less whether they have social security numbers.

The question then becomes, assuming defendant Pyatt is fully capable of obtaining a drivers license as he has in the past and only the lack of a social security number is preventing his being lawfully licensed at this time, is he being denied a privilege and thereby subjected to criminal charges only because he does not have a social security number? Obviously, the simple answer is that the defendant can avoid such prosecution by simply not driving however, that seems to beg the question. It would appear that defendant Pyatt is being denied a privilege available to others for a reason which is conceded to have nothing to do with his being able to satisfactorily perform that privilege. Thus, it appears that he is being denied equal protection of the law.

The respondents in Lauderbach contended that the DMV policy denied them equal protection of the law. The court bypassed this saying that the DMV was not required to issue licenses or II) cards to persons whose presence in the U.S. was not authorized under federal law. The Lauderbach Court however, did "conclude that those aliens whose presence in the United States is authorized under federal law, but are ineligible to obtain SSN's, are entitled to the subject DMV documents if otherwise qualified therefor," 35 CA4th at p. 584, 41 CR2d at p. 438. In adapting this holding to the instant case an equal protection argument is raised.

Defendant Pyatt has declared that he has never applied for a social security number therefore it is unknown if he is eligible or ineligible to obtain one. Assuming he had applied but was declared by the Social Security Administration to be ineligible, it appears he could then obtain a drivers license notwithstanding Section 1653.5. The same would be true of any other person lawfully within the U.S. found to be ineligible for a social security number. Defendant Pyatt has declared that he has never applied for such a number, therefore he has the same status as the person ineligible for a social security number when both go to the DMV to apply for a drivers license. While the other person is issued a drivers license defendant Pyatt is denied one for a reason which, as earlier stated, has nothing whatsoever to do with the ability to operate a vehicle upon the streets and highways. The distinction between "ineligible" and "refusing to obtain" would appear to have no substance within the context of determining who can and who cannot safely drive a vehicle. This would appear to be an unequal application of the law.

There is another aspect of the equal protection argument that seems to be relevant. The implementation of Section 1653.5 by virtue of which defendant Pyatt is now unable to become a licensed driver, has an "ex post facto ring" to it.

An ex post facto law is one which is passed after the occurrence of some act or conduct and makes that act or conduct unlawful. Section 1653.5 was passed at a time when defendant Pyatt was already a licensed driver, thus he had satisfactorily passed all DMV tests and requirements to obtain the license and had never performed in such a manner as to have the license revoked or suspended. While it is true that Section 1653.5 does not impose any criminal sanctions, and therefore cannot be classified as an ex post facto law, it nevertheless does have the effect of terminating defendant Pyatt's privilege to drive, a privilege that he was lawfully engaged in, unless he submit to a requirement that he obtain a social security number. This analogy to an ex post facto law would
have no relevance if the new requirement were related to an applicant's physical, mental, or emotional ability to safely operate a vehicle, but being identified by a social security number has no legitimate purpose in assuring such ability.

The end result herein is that a privilege to drive is afforded to all citizens who can prove the ability to do so safely, defendant Pyatt had previously proven such ability and was in fact lawfully exercising that privilege, and he is now being denied that privilege and is subjected to criminal sanctions simply because a new bureaucratic regulation, which has no conceivable connection to the state's interest in assuring that only competent drivers use the streets and highways, has been passed to which defendant Pyatt chooses not to conform. This would appear to be a classic case of big government overreaching to accommodate a separate state interest and in doing so has denied this defendant an equal application of the law.

For the reasons above stated defendant Pyatt's motion to dismiss is granted. This ruling is not intended to afford to defendant Pyatt or anyone else in a similar position a privilege to drive unlicensed but rather is limited to this case and these facts.

Dated: 5-1-01
Ronin M. Couillard, Judge of the Superior Court

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Originally posted by Lewish

FACTS

Defendant Melvin Pyatt was stopped by an officer of the California Highway Patrol on October 13, 2000, while driving a vehicle on Highway 99 in Tulare County.

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The Lauderbach Court however, did "conclude that those aliens whose presence in the United States is authorized under federal law, but are ineligible to obtain SSN's, are entitled to the subject DMV documents if otherwise qualified therefor," 35 CA4th at p. 584, 41 CR2d at p. 438

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