| T O P I C R E V I E W |
| Admin |
Posted - 02 Nov 2001 : 15:07:17
 Democracy is Controlled Mob Rule
These days, our world leaders sound so patriotic declaring their support of the elusive golden calf, "democracy." They enthusiastically shout to all who will listen “we must make the world safe for democracy!” What they are really saying is that they are declaring commercial global war in every nation that does not follow their economic monopoly of majority rule.
Take the example of Sierra Leone in West Africa. After more than 6 years of civil war, the United Nations and IMF covertly took over the bankrupt government by means of overdue monetary obligations and placed over 6 thousand "peacekeeping" troops into that tiny nation for the purpose of controlling the future of their imposed "democracy".
In Bosnia, the same scenario took place, but on a greater scale and with more military force. Throughout the world, children are being taught that their nation cannot survive without "democracy", the only way to purportedly obtain security and freedom. But in reality and by definition, "democracy" is nothing more than mob rule as manipulated and paid for by the elite and powerful international money brokers.
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He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living: ye therefore do greatly err. - Mark 12:27 |
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| Uncle Buck |
Posted - 19 May 2005 : 03:58:49
There is a need to understand positive law - jurisprudence. Without that foundation we are on shifting sand. An excellent summary of Austinian jurisprudence is from Leslie Stephen's 1900 book English Utilitarians Vol 3 Chapter 5.
http://phare.univ-paris1.fr/textes/Stephen/Utilitarians3/
Austin's position is given by his definition of law. It
implies what has been called the 'Austinian analysis,' and is
considered by his followers to dissolve all manner of
sophistries. It is already implied in Hobbes.(3*) A law, briefly,
is the command of a sovereign enforced by a sanction. The
definition gives the obvious meaning for the lawyer. Murder is
punishable by death. That is the law of England. To prove that is
the law, we need only go to the statute-book. The statute rests
upon the absolute authority of the legislature. It assumes the
existence, then, of a sovereign; an ultimate authority behind
which the lawyer never goes. It is for him infallible. The
English lawyer accepts an act of parliament as a man of science
accepts a law of nature. If there be any law which has not these
marks it is for him no law. Conduct is illegal when the state
machinery can be put in force to suppress it. Therefore the
sphere of law is precisely marked out by the conception of the
sovereign and the sanction.
The definition, then, may be true and relevant for all the
lawyer's purposes. But a definition, as J. S. Mill would point
out, is not a sufficient foundation for a philosophy. It may
provisionally mark out some province for investigation; but we
must always be prepared to ask how far the definition corresponds
to an important difference. Now Austin's definition has important
implications. It excludes as well as includes. Having defined a
law, he argues that many other things which pass by that name are
only 'metaphorically' or 'analogically' laws; and this raises the
question, whether the fact that they do not conform to his
definition corresponds to a vital difference in their real
nature? Is he simply saying, 'I do not call them laws,' or really
pointing out an essential and relevant difference of 'kind'? An
important point is suggested by one exclusion. We are not to
confound the so-called laws proper with the 'laws of nature' of
scientific phraseology. Such a law of nature is simply a
statement of a general fact. The astronomer asserts that the
motion of bodies may be described by a certain formula. In saying
so, he does not assert, even if he believes the inference to be
legitimate, that their motion is caused by a divine command or
enforced by a sanction. The actual uniformity is all that
concerns him. The uniformity produced by law proper led, as
Austin holds, to a confusion between different conceptions.
Austin was clearly right in pointing out the difference; and
scientific thinkers, before and since his time, have had to
struggle with a fallacy, singularly tenacious of life. A 'law of
nature' in the scientific sense is not a law in the jurist's
sense. The difference may be regarded in another way The two
senses of law differ as a 'command' differs from a proposition;
the imperative from the indicative mood. The command, 'Do not
murder,' is not a simple proposition. It belongs rather to action
than to belief. It utters a volition and therefore creates a
fact, instead of simply expressing a truth. Yet a command is also
a fact, and may be regarded as part of the general system of
fact. The command, 'Do not murder,' implies the fact, 'murder is
forbidden.' We might show that in certain social conditions
murder becomes punishable by death. That is a property of society
at certain stages. If the social machinery worked with perfect
accuracy, it would be as much a law of nature that a society
kills murderers as that a wolf kills lambs or that fire burns
straw. From this point of view, then, a 'law proper' falls under
the conception of a 'law of nature,' though a law of nature is
not a 'law proper.' It is a law of nature in the making, or a law
of nature which is only fulfilled when a number of complex
conditions of human conduct are satisfied. Austin, denying that
free-will means a really arbitrary element, would no doubt have
admitted that the 'law proper' was a product of the general laws
(in the scientific sense) of human nature. This aspect of the
case, however, passes out of sight. The law is something created;
'set,' as he calls it, or laid down by the sovereign at his own
will, and is thus perfectly arbitrary. That is the ultimate fact,
and makes a radical difference. We stop at the 'command,' and do
not ask how the command itself comes into existence. This
corresponds to J. S. Mill's distinction between 'making' and
'growing.' Law belongs to the region of 'making.' It originates
in the will of the sovereign. Whatever he wills and 'sanctions,'
and nothing else, is therefore law in the proper sense of the
term.
If I have to be like him who is going to be like me?
James 1:25 The Perfect Law of Liberty |
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